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ADMIRALTY.

Where the master of a vessel recommended a materialman
to the engineer as a proper person to do any work needed by
the vessel, and the engineer employed him in
implied

Consent of

Master

making some repairs, the master being on board
at the time and knowing that the work was going
on, it was held that the materialman was justified

in believing that the engineer was authorized to employ him
upon the credit of the steamer. This case falls within the
principle of The A#fred Dunois,76 Fed. 586, and is distinguishable from that of The H. C. Grady, 87 Fed. 232, there being
here something more than acquiescence upon the part of the
master: The Tiger, 89 Fed. 384.
The opinion of Lowell, J., in the recent case of The Iris, 88
Fed. 902, will be read with interest by all admiralty lawyers,
as being the last word on the vexed subject of
Maritime
Liens,
-liens for supplies and repairs to a vessel in her
Repdrs

Ordered by
Ostensible

It contains an excellent statement of
home port.
pot

the principles to be derived from such cases as
7hmas v. Osborn, 19 Howard, 22, The Kalarama,
Owner
Io Wall. 204, and The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558. In the
present case the vessel had been delivered to a vendee upon
part payment of the purchase money, under an agreement
whereby it was provided that she could be retaken by the
owner upon failure to pay the balance, the title not to pass
until said balance was paid. The apparent owner put a master
in charge of the vessel, and repairs were ordered by him.
The vendee becoming hopelessly insolvent, the owner retook
the vessel and denied that she was liable. Judge Lowell held
that there was nothing in the case to put the libellants on
inquiry and that they were justified in relying upon the holding out of the vendee as the owner.
In answer to the contention of the claimant that in the
vessel's home port the presumption is against the lien, the
court said: " If the presumption be taken to mean that the
authority of the master of a domestic vessel to contract for her
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ADMIRALTY (Continued).
repair cannot always be presumed, the statement is reasonable.
The-owner of a domestic vessel in some cases must be sought
out, and the authority of the master to bind him will not be
presumed as readily as in the case of a foreign vessel whose
owner is absent; but where the master had authority to order
the repairs, or where they were ordered directly by the owner,
it seems that credit is to be deemed to have been given to the
vessel, or to the owner personally, or to both, according to
the laws and usages of the domestic port, and the circumstances of the particular case."
Judge Brown, of the Southern District of New York, has
displayed his customary good sense in throwing the risks of
loading a vessel for her first voyage upon her
Proper
Ballast,
owners and not upon the charterers or shippers.
Owner's Risk The amount of ballast needed by a new vessel,
taken in connection with the- cargo, is always in some measure
a matter of experiment; and it is eminently just and proper
that the risk of any uncertainty in this respect should fall on
the owner; this is especially so where the ship is guaranteed
to be "tight, staunch and strong, and in every way fitted for
the voyage." As the jettison of part of the cargo was made
necessary by the unseaworthy condition of the ship, it was
held that the Harter Act did not exempt the owners from
liability: The Whitlieburn, 89 Fed. 526.
It is well settled that seamen who have signed articles for
a voyage, cannot be compelled to fulfill their contract if they
Rights of
refuse to go to sea because they believe the vessel
Passengers unseaworthy, unless upon a survey she be found
staunch and properly equipped. In the case of The Guardian,
89 Fed. 998, it is held that passengers are entitled to as much
protection as the crew, and have the right to act in the light
of appearances. Consequently, where a vessel appeared unseaworthy and was so reported in the public press, and the
experts who surveyed her said they could not "recommend
her for a passenger vessel in her present condition," the passengers were allowed to recover the price of their tickets,
although the vessel subsequently performed the voyage in
safety and clearly showed that she had been entirely seaworthy.
ASSIGNMENTS FOR CREDITORS.

It was held in Belowsv. Bellows, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 853, that,
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ASSIGNMENTS FOR CREDITORS (Continued).

while a person may by proper assignment convey the right to
Right to Use use his name in any business, yet such right does
Name
not pass under the ordinary phraseology of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors.

ATTORNEYS.

The Supreme Court of New York has added another to the
many cases dealing with contingent fees. In Taylor v. Long
costs,
Island R. Co., 53 N. Y. Suppl. 830, the plaintiff
Right of
in an action for negligence agreed to pay her
Lien
attorney seventy per cent. of the amount recovered,
but nothing if he failed, to collect damages. A large sum was
recovered, of which the attorney paid over seventy per cent.
to his client and retained the remaining thirty per cent. and
all the costs recovered. A motion was made to compel him
to pay over these costs. The court held that the costs were
a part of the "amount recovered " and did not belong to the
attorney, but that he had a right to thirty per cent. of them
under his agreement. The language of Re Bailey, 31 Hun,
6o8, and Delaney v. Miller, 84 Hun, 244, was disapproved as
tending to the theory that the costs belonged absolutely to
the attorney. He has, in fact, only a lien on them: Starin v.
Mayor, lo6 N. Y. 87.
BANKRUPTCY.

Though the Bankruptcy Law of July I, 1898, prohibits the
filing of petitions until one or four months after its date, yet
Bankruptcy as it provides that it shall go into full force and
Law, Date
effect upon its passage, proceedings under conflicting state insolvent laws should not be begun after that
date: Parmenter Co. v. Hamilton, 51 N. E. (Mass.) 529.

BANKS AND BANKING.

State Saving Bank of Detroit v. Foster, 76 N. W. (Minn.)
499, is of some importance as defining who are depositors in
Who are
the eye of the law. Admitting that one bank
Depositors
may be a depositor of another, it was, nevertheless, held that the certificate of deposit issued in consideration
of the right to draw on the payee bank for a like amount did
not constitute the payee bank a depositor under the statute.
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CARRIERS.

A railway, running along the streets within one city and
over- a highway to a neighboring city under a law allowing
any "street-railway companies" extending their
street
lines beyond the limits of their town, to build on
Raiway,
What is,
any highway of a width of ioo feet or more, was
Taxation
operated at first by steam engines, but afterwards
by overhead trolley. Its main business was that of transporting passengers, but some express and freight cars were run.
On appeal from tax settlement, held to be a "street railway,"
and not a "railway corporation" within Code 1873, § 1317,
providing for assessment of such corporations by the State
Executive Council; Cedar Rapids & M. C. Ry. Co. v. City
of Cedar Rapid (Sup. Ct. of Iowa), 76 N. W. 728.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

The undoubted rule that the lex domicili governs the construction of a will, was applied by the Court of Chancery of
Testamentary

Truat,
Law of
Domicil

New Jersey to a bequest to a trustee in New

Jersey, for a married woman's sole and separate
use. The trust by the law of Pennsylvania, the
testator's domicil, would be active, but by New

Jersey law would be passive only. The fact that the trust had
its situs in New Jersey and was to be carried out by a citizen
of that state, was held immaterial. The Pennsylvania law
governed: Rosenbaum v. Garrett,41 Atl. 253. Cross v. U. S.
T'. CO., 13 N. Y. 330 (1856), is in accord. See, also, Spindle
v. Shreve, III U. S. 542, 547 (1883); Ruebsam'sEst.,26
W. N. C. (Pa.) 311 (1890); Hope v. Brewer, 136 N. Y. 126,
32 N. E. 558 (1892). In.the latter case a bequest in trust,
valid by the law of the state of administration and of the
domicil of the trustees, was enforced in New York, the domicil
of the testator, although by the law of the latter state it would
be void as a perpetuity. Interstate trusts seem to be secure if
upheld by either law. In Fowler's Appeal, 125 Pa. 388
(1889), s. c., 17 Atl. 431, 23 W. N. C. 500, the laws of three
states were considered. The law of the domicil of the settlor
and of that of the cestui que trust favored the trust, which was
invalid by the law of the trustee's domicil. The court upheld
the validity of the trust.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Supreme Court of California has decided that the
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

constitutional provision (Art. 4, § 25, sub-d. I6, California
Constitution) forbidding local or -special laws,
Exemptions
from Collateral or laws releasing or extinguishing in whole or
Inheritance Tax,

1Special

LawsI

in part the liability of any corporation or person
to the state, is not infringed by the retro-

spective exemption from the inheritance tax of certain classes
of corporations and relatives (St. 1897, p. 77, amending Act
of March 23, 1893). The court refers to the Maryland case
of Montague v. State, 54 Md. 481 (I880), which pronounced
valid an amendment to the collateral inheritance law of that
state, putting the " husband" among the exempted classes.
Exemption of
Residents

The amended statute in California included,

Only,

among those exempt, the "niece or nephew.
when a resident of this state." This distinction

Privileges
and
Immunities"

between resident and non-resident relatives was

held unconstitutional und er Const. U. S., Art. 4,

§ 2. The court, thereupon, rejected the invalid limitation,
and, construing the statute as if such part had not been
enacted, exempted all nieces and nephews: In re Stamford's
Estate, 54 Pac. 259.
The Maryland Institute for the Promotion of Mechanic Arts,
a corporation of Maryland receiving an annual appropriation
Fourteenth from the state, in 1893 entered into a contract
Amendment, with the city of Baltimore for the instruction of a
Private
nme
certain number of pupils to be appointed by the
Schools
Exclusion o, city councilmen. One councilman appointed a
Colored Pupils colored youth to the scholarship. The appointee
was denied admittance on account of his color, and filed a
petition for a mandamus requiring the school officers to admit
him. Decree dismissing petition was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Maryland. The court said, " . . . suppose . . .
that there was a school of great merit, conducted exclusively
for the instruction of colored pupils in branches of learning
not taught in the public schools, and that the legislature saw
fit to appropriate money for the tuition of a number of colored
pupils. It is not probable that such action would be assailed
as forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment because of an
unjust discrimination against the whites:" State v. Maryland
Institute, 41 Atl. 127.
The Illinois Act (Laws 1879, p. I13) which provides that
receiving deposits by an insolvent bank shall be punished as
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embezzlement, does not deprive one convicted of
such offence of any liberty or property right
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
ment,
Fourteenth
The privilege which the banker had of taking
Amendment deposits in insolvency before the passage of the
Act was not a "matter of personal prerogative or property
right:" Dreyer v. Pease, 88 Fed. 998. The Oklahoma Act
(Statutes 1893, c. 7, sec. I), of similar effect, was sustained in
WinfieM v. Ott, 54 Pac. 714.
Insolvent
Banks,
Embezzle-

In Pingree v. Mich. Cent. R., 76 N. W. 635, the Supreme
Court of Michigan has applied the doctrine of the Dartmouth
College case to a railroad, the charter of which
Railroads,
Legislative gave it the right of fixing its own rates under a
Control of maximum of three cents a mile. This charter
Fares,

Impairment was held to tie the hands of the legislature,

although the railroad originally was but an unimContract
portant local concern, and since that time, under
legislative permission to extend its lines, has grown into a
gigantic state and interstate system.
of Charter

CONTRACTS.

When a lender is a resident of one state and the borrower
is a resident of another, and the evidence of debt, and the
Conflict of deeds given to secure same, as well as all other
L.aws,
papers connected with the transaction, are exePlace of
cuted in the state of the borrower's residence,
Execution
and there is nothing in the papers to indicate that
it was the intention of the parties that the contract should be
controlled by the law of the state of the lender's residence, the
contract, as to its validity, form and effect, will be controlled
by the law of the state in which the contract was executed:
Hollis v. Caenant Building and Loan Ass'n (Supreme Court
of Georgia), 31 S. E. 215.
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Hoyle v. Southern Saw
Works, 31 S. E. 137, has reiterated the rule that while inadequacy of price alone will not be sufficient ground
Fraud,
Inadequacy of
Consideration

on which to set aside a contract, yet that circumstance, taken in connection with others of a sus-

picious nature, may afford such a presumption of fraud as
would authorize the court to make such a decree.
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CONTRACTS (Continued).

The payment of money for lobbying being against public
policy, the court will not compel contribution between partners
Lobbying, on account thereof, nor will it, when one partner
Contribution is chargeable with the receipts, allow him credit

for money so expended: McDonaldv.Buckstaff et al.(Supreme
Court of Nebraska), 76 N. W. 476.
In Hlbrounetal.v. Herzog, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 841, (Supreme
Court; App. Div. of New York), the plaintiff, relying on the
Rescission, defendant's statement to a mercantile agency that
Waiver
he owned certain property, sold him goods on
credit, taking notes for the purchase money. Subsequently
learning that the statements were incorrect, the plaintiff called
on defendant, and being informed that the statement was a.
mistake, expressed himself as satisfied, and did not demand
the goods or the price, nor did he' offer to return the notes.
Five months later, and before the notes were due, the plaintiff
brought an action to recovei" the price of the goods. Held,
that plantiff had waived his right to rescind either the entire
contract or that portion of it relating to the time of payment.
The perennial question involving the statute of frauds comes
this month from Wisconsin, the Supreme Court of that state
Statute of deciding that an oral agreement to purchase growFrauds,
ing timber and manufacture it, is within the statute
Contract for
Purchase of and unenforceable; and that a written collateral
Growing agreement between two of the partners, reciting
Timber
that a certain portion of the profits of such purchase should be shared by one of them " and his associates "
is not a sufficient memorandum of a partnership with one who
was not a party thereto, but was alleged to be one of the
"associates:" Seymour et al. v. Cushway, 76 N. W. 769.
By a statute of New York (Laws 1892, c. 602, § 6; Laws
1893, c. 66) it is provided that no one shall do business as a
Unregistered plumber till he has passed an'examination and
obtained a certificate of competency and has had
Plumbers,
Suit for Work himself registered; a failure to comply being made
and Materials amisdemeanor. InJohnstonv. Dahgren,
52 N. Y.

Suppl. 555, the question was raised whether a plumber, who
had not obtained his certificate and registered, could maintain
suit for work done and materials supplied. The majority held
that it did not need "the citation of authorities to establish the
proposition that, as the contract to do plumbing under these
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circumstances is unlawful, the courts will not give any aid in
enforcing it, and will not permit a person to recover anything because he has performed it: Broom, Leg. Max. 576."
Ingraham, J., delivered a very vigorous dissent, he being of
the opinion that "where a statute declares an act which was
before legal to*be illegal, and provides a penalty for a violation
of the statute, that penalty is exclusive."
CORPORATIONS.

Pullman's Palace Car Company seems to figure in litigation
in which the results reached cannot but be regretted by all
who are interested in sound legal development.
Having had the benefit of judicial aberration in
Charter
Power,
the long litigation with the Central Transportation
Hoiang of Company, a certain rough justice was done when
Real Estte the corporation. was made to suffer lately by
the decision of a bare majority of the Supreme Court of
Illinois in People, ex-rel. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 51 N. E.
664. The proceeding was an information in the nature of quo
warranto to forfeit the charter of the respondent for abuse of
its chartered authority "to purchase, acquire and hold such
real estate as may be necessary for the successful prosecution
of its business." The alleged abuse consisted in maintaining
for many years without objection from the state a business
block in the city of Chicago, in which it rented rooms not
needed for the use of the corporation; in likewise maintaining
a boiler plant, from which the corporation sold the surplus
steam; in likewise maintaining a town with highways, sewerage, water and light systems and schools, churches and business houses-all erected and maintained, not for profit, but
merely for the purpose of creating a community of skilled
workers and artisans who, under such conditions, could best
perform, it was thought, the grade of work essential to the successful prosecution of the business of the corporation. A
majority of the court undertook to distinguish the many cases
in which similar exercises of power (though on a smaller scale)
have been countenanced by courts--on the ground that in
those cases the acts done were " necessary," whereas in the
present case they were expedient merely. An exception was
made in the case of the business block and the power plant, on
the theory that the surplus capacity in each case might at some
time be required by the corporation itself. The dissenting
opinion of three of the justices is a satisfactory refutation of
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the position of the majority. It is, perhaps, to be regretted that
the true function of a corporate charter was not more carefully
considered. The function of a charter is not to confer power,
but to define the scope of the corporate business. The real
question in this case was whether the respondent was engaging, as a business, in an enterprise beyond the scope of its
charter. Clearly it was not. The activities which were complained of were engaged in, not as an end in themselves, with
a view to profit, but as a means to an end-the end being the
successful prosecution of the very business which the charter
defines.
It will be remembered that the Supreme Court of Alabama,
in Elyton Land Company v. Birmingham Warehouse & Elevator
Co., 92 Ala. 425, made a careful investigation and
Stock Paid
for In
statement of the law in regard to fraudulent overProperty, valuation of property exchanged for the stock of
Fraudulent

Over-

a corporation. The same court was called upon
to deal with this question again in Lea v. Iron Belt
Mercantile Company, 24 So. 28. A demurrer to a creditor's
bill was filed on the ground (inter alia) that the bill charged
no fraud against the defendant. The demurrer admitted, however, an averment that the appellant and his associates had
conveyed to the corporation real estate (for which they had just
paid $9o,ooo) as full payment for stock of the par value of
$I,25o,ooo.
After citing the earlier decision, the court observed: "No other charge of fraud was necessary than such
as is inferrable from the above averment."
Valuation

A late case on the subject of ultra vires contracts of corporations has arisen in New York, a jurisdiction which, on
Ultra Vires that question, has always held views peculiar to
Contracts, itself. A loan association, which was authorized
Guaranteed to do business only on the "mutual" plan, issued
Stock
stock guaranteed to pay a certain-dividend, and as
securities therefor deposited certain mortgages as a sort of
collateral. Having gone into the hands of a receiver, the
latter brought suit in equity to recover the securities. The
court, in pronouncing judgment, after emphasizing the fact
that, while the contract was ultra vires, it was neither malum
in se nor malumprohibitum,continued: " The receiver, without
restoring, or offering to restore, to these defendants the money
obtained from them through this device, now asks a court of
equity to take from the defendants these mortgages which

PROGRESS OF THE LAV.
CORPORATIONS (Continued).

represent their monies. When did a court of equity, knowingly, give active assistance to a suitor confessedly pursuing
innocent parties for the purpose of robbery ? The court has
sometimes refused to aid the innocent in the enforcement of
tainted contracts, or contracts void from public policy ;.but it
has uniformly refused to assist the wrongdoer, as in the Utica
Insurance Cases:" Dikinson v. Continental Trust Co., 52
N. Y. Suppl. 672.
CRIMINAL

L

AW.

The Supreme Court of New York, in People v. Winant, 53
N. Y. Suppl. 695, decided that a bribe taker is an
Acco-plice accomplice of the bribe giver, and hence his testimony must be corroborated.
The rule that a public prosecution is under the control of
the public, and not the injured individual was exemplified in
Rape,
State v: Newcomer, 54 Pac. 685. In this case the
Condonation defendant was arrested on a charge of rape, but
by the Injured the parties agreed that a marriage should take
Individual place, and the prosecution should be discontinued.

The marriage took place, and they lived together as man and
wife, the prosecution having been dismissed and the costs
taxed to the defendant. Subsequently the defendant refused
to live with his wife on hearing of rumors that she was having
improper relations with other men. Her father then filed the
complaint in this case for rape. The above facts were set up
as a defence. Held, no defence.

DAMAGES.

In Braun v. Craven, 51 N. E. (Ill.) 657, the court refused,
in accordance with precedent, to allow damages for mental
Remoteness, suffering alone, unconnected with any physical

Mental

injury. It appeared that the defendant had used
threats and sharp words to plaintiff which caused
her a nervous shock which resulted in St. Vitus' dance. It
was held that the damage was not the natural and probable
consequence of plaintiff's act. See, accord, Scheffer v. R. R.
Co., 105 U. S. 249; Ewing v. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. 40; Railway
Comr's v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222; Mitchell v. Ry. Co., 151
Suffering

N.Y. 107.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

ELECTIONS.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, construing a statute
(Gen. St. 1894, § 30) providing that the method-of determining the largest number of votes polled at the lasf
Baliots,
Construction preceding general election by a political party
shall be by taking the average vote received by
of Statute
such of its candidates as were not endorsed by any other
party, holds that it does not apply to a case where each of
two independent parties separately nominate all of the candidates of the other: Higgins et al. v. Berg, 76 N. W. 788.
EVIDENCE.

In Collum v. People, 54 Pac. (Cal.) 589, it was held. that a
confession of one conspirator is not admissible against another
Confession of if made after the alleged crime is complete and
the object of the conspiracy accomplished, nor
Co-Conspira.
tor,
Io,
ng can such evidence, itself inadmissible, be admitted
to impeach the credit of the witness, unless it
clearly and directly contradicts some prior portion
of his testimony. An accessory after the fact is not an -accomplice, and a conviction on his uncorroborative testimony will
stand.
Witness,

Accomplice

Stephens v. Comm., 47 S. W. (Ky.) 229, is an instance of the
rule that dying declarations are admissible if the declarant
himself anticipates death as imminent. There the
Dying
Declarations declarations were admitted, although the physician
attending him was encouraging him by holding out hopes of
his recovery, the declarant himself expressing his expectation
of death, and his condition being very precarious, his lung
perforated, and blood spurting forth at every cough or gasp.
Two cases in the New York Supplement serve to define the
boundaries of the rule which admits evidence of trade customs
Evidence of and usages to vary the apparent meaning of
Usage to vary written contracts : In a county court of Cataraugus case, Bonnold v. Glasser, 53 N. Y. Suppl.
a Written
Contract
1021, evidence was admitted that a "thousand"
to
bricks were be computed not by number but by cubic space, it
being shown that such was the universal usage among bricklayers on the principle that trade contracts are made with reference to all usages of such trades, and are to be interpreted in the
light thereof; but in the Supreme Court (Appellate Division),
in the case of Hcrberger v.Johnson, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 1057, an
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action to recover commissions for "placing" a loan excluded
evidence that "placing" a loan included the payment of all
expenses, for the reason that use of the word "place" was too
familiar and well settled to allow of expert testimony to
interpret its meaning.
In Kokes v. State, 76 N. W. (Neb.) 467, the court took
judicial notice of the United States Census, the school census
taken by authority of a statute of the state and
Jadicial
Notice
by the officers empowered for the purpose, and of
the state and county elections and the result of each and all
of them.
It is a well settled rule that a witness may refresh his
memory by referring to a memorandum made at or near the
Refreshing time of the transaction in question. This is someMemory, times called a . rule of necessity and is even
Independent extended where circumstances call for it. Where
Recollection an employer always looked over
and verified
certain memoranda or entries made by his book-keeper, he
was allowed to testify as to the facts contained in such entries,
though he had no independent recollection of them even after
referring to the paper. The ground adopted by the court
was that the witness at the time the entries were made knew
they were correct: Clark v. Bank. 52 N. Y. Suppl. IO64.
This seems to be the practice in some other jurisdictions,
both as to the admission of entries made by a person other
than the witness and as to the lack of necessity of independent
recollection: Borrough v. Martin, 2 Camp. 112; Anderson v.
Whalley, 3 C. & Kir. 54; R. v. St. Martin's, 2 A. & E. 210;
Russell v. Coffin, 8 Pick. 143; Pigott v. Halloway, i Binn. 436.

IRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

Guichtel v. Jewell, 41 Atl. (N. J.) 227, contains an equitable
solution of a frequently recurring difficulty. An insolvent
Return of debtor had made a fraudulent assignment of
Portion of property to which he became heir, to a creditor,
Assigned
whose claim, however, was considerably less than
Property the property assigned; as it was not proved, however, that the assignee was aware of assignor's fraudulent
intent, the court allowed the assignee to keep such sum as
wofild repay her, turning over the balance to assignor's
receiver.
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GUARANTY.

Hawey v. First National Bank, 76 N. W. (Neb.) 879, is a
sample of a very common class of business . transactions.
Hawey, wishing to assist his son, signed a guarPayment,
Extension of anty to the bank for $7000 of any loan or 'disTime
count to the son within one year. Several loans
were made and were renewed by the son's notes from time to
time beyond the year. It was held that the notes were not
taken in payment of, but simply to represent, the original
loan, and hence the father was liable. The extensions of time
were excused on the ground of a well proved usage.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Hager v. National German-American Bank, 31 S. E. (Ga.)
141, has the interest which almost always attaches to a case

Contracts of involving a conflict of laws. A married woman
Married
living in Tennessee, where the common law
Women
restrictions as to her power to contract, still exist,
executed in that state a promissory note, which, however, was
dated in Minnesota, where a married woman may make such
an instrument. It was held by the Supreme Court of Georgia
that the law of the place of performance cannot be invoked to
aid a person who is seeking to enforce a contract which is
absolutely void at the place where it was executed.
In Kunze v. Kunze, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 938, it was decided
that a reasonable allowance of alimony will not be modified,
because the husband has lost employment through
Divorce,
Alimony
his wife's acts; at best, such facts may be used
as a defence in proceedings for contempt for non-payment.
No alimony can be allowed where a decree is entered
declaring a marriage void ab initio; it is based
Alimony
upon the husband's duty to support his wife and
cannot be claimed by one who, in the eye of the law, never
was his wife: Park v. Park, 53 N. Y. Suppl..677.
Mrriage,

INSURANCE.

Action was brought on a life insurance policy taken out by
G. B., who was killed while riding on a locomotive. He had
been riding on the passenger car, but left it, at
Accident
Policy,
the invitation of the railroad superintendent, to
Conveyance," ride on the locomotive, where he was killed in
-p-'senser"
a wreck. The insurance policy provided, inter
alia, that the company should not be liable if death ensued
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while the insured was "in or on any such conveyance [using
steam power] not provided for transportation of passengers."
Held, that the company was liable, since the whole train,
including the engine, constituted a "conveyance."
Held,
also, that the insured, when killed, had not ceased to be
a "passenger" under another clause in the policy which
allowed a double recovery for death "while riding as a passenger in any passenger conveyance using steam as a motive
power:" Berliner v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 53 Pac. (Cal.) 918.
The Federal courts hold that where an accident policy
excepts "intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any
other person," the company is, nevertheless, liable
Accdent
Policy,
for "death caused by the voluntary act of the
Homicide by assured, when his reasoning faculties were so far
Lunatic
impaired that he was not able to understand the
moral character, or the general nature, consequences, and
effect, of the act he was about to commit." Where the death
is caused, not by the, assured, but by a third person in the
state of mind just described, it would seem but logical to hold
the insurance company liable, and such a result was reached in
Berger v. Ins. Co., 88 Fed. 241.

JUDGMENTS.

In accordance with principle and authority, the Circuit
Court of the Southern District of California has held, Savings and Trust Co. v. Bear Valley Co., 89 Fed.
Lien,
Consentto 32, that the period for which a judgment lien exExtend
ists by statute cannot be extended by consent or
agreement of the parties thereto.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

In Humiston, Keeling & Co. v. Wheeler, 51 N. E. 893, a five
story building was rented to defendant, with the exception of
LMM,
a few rooms on the second and fourth floors.
Destruction of Before the expiration of the lease a fire occurred
orionf in the building, whereby the interior was burned
Buiding,

Abatement of out down to the first floor, but the walls remained
Rent
intact. The first floor was so covered with debris
as to be untenantable.
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In an action on the lease for rent, the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that there was not such a "total" destruction of
the building as would extinguish- the lease, since (i) the
supplying of a new roof and floors would have been "repairs"
and not the "creation of a new building," and (2) the lease
included both the building and the land, so that even if the
building had been totally destroyed, there would have been a
subject matter, the land, upon which the lease coilld have
operated. The theory of the survival of a lease, after the
destruction of the demised premises, is discussed by Mr.
Joseph H. Taulane in an interesting article in 29 Am. Law
Rev. 35 1.
A novel case of misdescription in a lease came beiore" the
Chancery Division in Cowen v. Truefitt [1898], 2 Ch. 551.
Le"e
The lease was of the second floors of 13 and 14
Mtwcscrp- Old Bond street, and granted a right of ingress
tion
and egress by the staircase in No. 13. It appeared that there was no staircase in No. 13, it having been
torn out before the lease was made; but there was a staircase
suited for the lessee's use in No. 14, which lessor refused to
allow lessee to use, wherefore this action.
The defendant contended that a wrong description could be
cut out of the instrument, but that something else-in this
case the word "14 "--could not be substituted for it. The
court held, however, that the intention of the parties was to
grant a right of way over the "staircase " which led up to
the demised premises, and that the said staircase had merely
been misdescribed; and this fact was apparent from the lease,
and decided in favor of the plaintiff While there is no decision exactly in point, it is held that where a deed may operate
in one of two ways-one consistent with the evident intention
of the parties and the other opposed thereto--it shall be construed to effectuate the intent: Solly v. Forbes, 4 Moo. 448;
Hotham v. E. India Co., i L. R. 638. In case of uncertainty
in applying the description to the premises demised, the intention of the parties as to the extent of the demise is usually a
question for the jury : Liley v. Mayers, 25 Pa. 398 ; PRitnam
Bond, ioo Mass. 58; but where the language of a lease
is not ambiguous, evidence as to the intention of the parties is not admissible: Davis v. Renisford, 17 Mass. 207;
Brainard v. Arnold, 27 Conn. 617; Clark v. Bayard, 9
N. Y. 183.
".
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LIBEL AND SLANDER.

The Appellate Court of Indiana, in Samples v. Carnahan,
5 1 N. E. 425, held that where one business acquaintance voluntarily writes to another advising him if a certain
Privileged
Cmmanica. note of the acquaintance for $50 was in the hands
tion
of a certain "jack-leg lawyer," to call it in, as he
Recting on was in danger of losing it entirely, and that his
.Lawyer
money was safer where it was than in
the hands
-of such a lawyer, he cannot excuse himself when sued for
libel on the ground that it was a privileged communication.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Cole v. Andrews, 76
N. W. 962, was of the opinion that a citizen going to the
county attorney and communicating certain facts
prIvmleged to him for the purpose of having a prosecution
Comtio,,,
fnunlcafor a public offence instituted, does not give rise
Attorneyand to the relation of attorney and client, and the
Client
communication is not privileged, and cannot be
treated as such if he is afterwards sued for malicious prosecution.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

Two familiar principles are illustrated in O'Neill v. Traynor,
53 N. Y. Suppl. 918, to wit: (I.) That when a servant has
Discharge, been wrongfully discharged before the end of her
Damages
term, the burden is on the master to show that
she neglected to seek for, or refused to accept similar employment. (2.) That though the servant sue before the expiration of the term, she may, if the trial does not take place
until after such expiration, recover damages for the entire
term.
MORTGAGES.

Phillipsv. Yoeman, 41 Atl. (N. J.) 104, is a curious illustration of the ambiguities that may occur in even a carefully
Foreclosure, drawn legal instrument. A two years' mortgage,
Redemption with the usual option to the mortgagee to declare
the principle due upon non-payment of interest, contained the
unusual provision that the mortgagor should "have the right
to redeem any or all of the mortgaged property" at any time
prior to the two years hereinbefore mentioned upon payment
of specified sums. Upon bill to foreclose within the two years,
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it was argued for plaintiff that this clause was intended to be
inoperative, in case the time for payment of the entire debt had
arrived, whether by limitation or by default; while defendant's
counsel conceded plaintiff's right to foreclosure, but insisted
upon a right of redemption being expressed in the decree.
The court, however, took an intermediate view, viz.: that
under New Jersey practice there could be no redemption after
foreclosure, wherefore it necessarily followed that plaintiff's
right to foreclose was suspended until the expiration of the
two years.
Bigs v. Hoddinott [1898], 2 Ch. 307, is an important case.
A mortgage of a hotel to a brewer contained a provision that
Restricting the mortgagors would purchase their beer and
Equity of
liquors solely from the mortgagee. Upon motion
Redemption to enjoin their purchase elsewhere, it was argued
for defendants, upon the authority of Jennings v. Ward, 2
Vern. 520, that the mortgagee can obtain no advantage by the
mortgage except the payment of principal, interest and costs.
It was held, however, both in the lower court and upon appeal
that the provision was valid because it did not, on -the one
hand, clog the equity of redemption, nor on the other was it
unreasonable in itself, as there was a corresponding covenant
on the part of the mortgagee to sell the beer and liquors to
the mortgagor.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

In an action to enjoin the delivery of certain corporate stock
of the city of New York, by the comptroller, to any person
other than the plaintiff, it appeared that the stock
Municipal
Bonds,
having been advertised as required by statute, said
Conditional statute providing that the award should be made
Bid
to the highest bidder, the plaintiff bid for same.
"Our bid subject to the approval of the legality of the issues
by our counsel." Defendant submitted on the same day a
lower bid, unqualified in its terms, and the issue was awarded
to him. Held, that plaintiff's bid was conditional, and therefore illegal: Trowbridge et al. v. City of New York et al.
(Supreme Court of New York), 53 N. Y. Suppl. 616.
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in W)'att v. City of Rome,
31 S. E. i88, decided that a municipal corporation while

Negligence of enforcing a valid ordinance requiring citizens and
Office,
residents of the city to submit to vaccination, is
Vaccination exercising a governmental power, and is, there-

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (Continued).

fore, not liable to a citizen who may sustain damage on account
of impure vaccine matter negligently administered to him by
one of the officers or agents of such corporation.
NEGLIGENCE.
That people who use electricity are practically quasiinsurers at certain times and places was held by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Overall v. Loisville Electric
Electricity,
CO., 47 S. W. 442. The facts were that the
plaintiff was an employe of a telephone company,
and while working at the top of a pole fixing a
wire of his company, it came in contact with one
of the wires of the defendant company which was heavily
charged and not properly insulated, from which plaintiff
received a shock and was injured. Held, that an electric
light company is liable for injuries resulting from its failure to
furnish perfect protection fro'm electric currents at points where
persons will probably come into contact with its wires, and it
is not sufficient to tell the jury that it is the duty of the defendant to observe the highest degree of care usually exercised
by prudent persons engaged in the same or similar business
to keep the wires s6 insulated as to be reasonably safe and
free from danger.
Required,
Telephone

The question as to how long a railroad company can block
a crossing and the right of pedestrians to cross through cuts in
the trains was before the Supreme Court of PennStreet
Crossing, sylvania in Golden v. P. .R. Co., 4i Atl. 302. It
Unlawful

Obstruction appeared that the plaintiff, a child of seven years,

by Railroad came to the crossing and found it blocked by the
defendants' train, which block had been maintained for nearly
a half-hour. The boy then went across the pavement to a
point where there was an opening between the cars, and proceeded to cross, when the cars were suddenly backed without
any warning, and he was injured. Held, that the block was
unlawful, and that the above facts constituted negligence on
the part of the defendant company.
PARENT AND CHILD.

It is familiar law that services rendered by a child, even
though married and presumed to be owing to natural affecContract for tion, and not to compensation promised; and that
Services
loose statements of intention to pay, made by
aeceased parent, are not sufficient to rebut the presumption.
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Dash v. Inabinet, 3 S. E. (S. C.) 297, is a recent close case,
in which the Appellate Court thought there was some evidence of a contract, which should have been left to the.juryr
to pass upon.
PARTNERSHIP.

A and B became partners in the work on a public contract
awarded them by a municipality. B went to the municipality
Confidential for the purpose of closing the contract and furRelation,
nishing the necessary security. The municipal
Good Faith authorities, having received from a third person
false information as to the financial standing of A, refused to
close the contract with him as a party. B did not inform Aof the reasons for this action and without A's knowledge proceeded to close the contract in his own name. The Circuit
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (AMlt/er v.
O'Boyle, 8 9 Fed. i4o) properly sustained a bill for a preliminary injunction filed by A, on the theory that B was to be
regarded as trustee for the firm, and that A might prevent B
from excluding him from participating in the management of
the business.
PROPERTY.

In a suit to foreclose a mortgage made to secure the payment of a promissory note, it appeared that the payee attempted
aift,

to make a gift of the note to the defendant under

the following circumstances: The payee, shortly
before committing suicide, endorsed the note in blank and
placed it in an envelope addressed to the defendant, which
was left upon a table. The envelope contained also a letter
giving directions as to the delivery of another letter. This
sealed envelope was found by the defendant, when attracted
to the room of the payee by the fatal pistol shot. It was
picked up by the defendant and handed by hin to the plaintiff,
the executor of the suicide. A week or so before, the suicide
had said to the defendant, referring to the note, "I might as well
give it to you." The Supreme Court of Oregon held that
although it was clear, from the evidence, that there was an
intention to make a gift, yet that none had actually been
made, since the second requisite of a valid gift, delivery, was
not here satisfied. The alleged donor never parted with his
dominion over the note; it remained under his absolute control:
Liebe v. Bauiman, 54 Pac. 179.
Delivery
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REAL PROPERTY.

In Taylor v. Clark, 89 Fed. 7 (Circuit Court, S. D. California), it is held that a bill to quiet title will not be enterBill to Quiet tained by the Federal courts where the defendant
Title,
is in full possession of the land. This is true,
densant in though the statute law of the state in which suit
Passesion is brought gives a right to maintain such a bill
under such circumstances (see Felton v. Justice, 51 Cal. 529),
because the Federal courts are governed in their equity jurisdiction by the practice of English Courts of Chancery. It
has been held by the United States Supreme Court that a bill
to quiet title could be maintained when neither of the parties
was in possession of the premises: Holland v. Challen, I Io
U. S. I5.
Property was conveyed by a deed containing a covenant
that there should not be erected on the premises any building
Deed,
other than for the use or purpose of a private
covenant, dwelling. This was a bill in equity brought to
. Private
restrain, the erection of a three-story frame flat
Dwellings,"
Apartment house, with five rooms on a floor, suitable for
touse
three families, on the ground that it was not a
"private dwelling" within the terms of the covenant. The
Court of Chancery of New Jersey granted the bill.
Chancellor McGill said, "It is manifest that her [complainant's] purpose was to preserve the privacy and residential
character of the property. . . . Not only does the term,
'a private dwelling,' by force of the word, 'dwelling,'
restrict the character of buildings, by eliminating all buildings for business purposes, such as stores, factories, and the
like, but it also, by force of the word 'private,' excludes
buildings for residential purposes of public character, such as
hotels or general public boarding and community houses.
At the argument, counsel for the defendants characterized a
flat as a number of private dwellings, built one upon another.
If this is a true definition, such a building is objectionable to
the restriction, because but a single private dwelling is contemplated, not a bunch of private dwellings. The restriction
is to 'a private dwelling,' in the singular, not to a building
of private dwellings in the plural. I think, also, that the flat
cannot be deemed a private dwelling. It is really a community house, designed for the accommodation of more than an
individual and his household, which I consider to be the sense
in which the word 'private' is to be taken:" Skillman v.
Smat/ehurst et x., 40 Atl. 855.
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The same result was reached in Gil/is v. Bailey, 2 1 N. H.
in the interpretatio.n of the words, "a single
dwelling house."
149 (r850),

The Supreme Court of Michigan has recently held that
where real property is deeded to a man for the express purpose
Lfe Estates, of his obtaining credit on the strength of his ownerDeed,
ship of the land, he to deed the property back to
Bona tide
Purchaser

the grantor during his life, or to devise it to him in
his will, the grantee takes but a life estate, and

that on his death the grantor is entitled to the land as against
all but bonafide purchasers and creditors of the grantee. The
wife of the grantee was held not to be a bona fide purchaser.
who could claim as against the original grantor, where it appeared that the wife had voluntarily -given her husband certain
moneys and he had said that she should have everything he
owned in return, and had deeded the premises a few days before
his death: Williams v. Williams, 76 N. W. 1039.
In Davis eta. v. Monroe, 41 AUt. 44, the question at issue concerned the title to a certain piece of land. Appellant had deeded
another tract of land to one Cobb, but by fraud
Deed,
the deed was made to include the land in question,
Notice,
and was so recorded. The Supreme Court of
Statuteof Pennsylvania held that the recording of the deed
was not constructive notice of the grantee's
claim
under it, and the statute of limitations did not, therefore, begin
to run. The record is notice only to those who are bound to
search for it, including parties subsequently dealing with the
land, or concerned with its title. The grantor is under no
obligations to see to its recording, or to examine the terms
thereof; consequently it is no notice to him.
In Lewis v. Bryce, 4z Atl. (Pa.) 275, a devise to testator's
daughters " during their lives-said property.to descend and
be inherited by said daughters' children and their
Rule in
Shelley's Case heirs forever"-was held to vest only a life estate

in the daughters, the court holding that the word "their" referred back to the word " children," and not to the word
"daughters;" so that the case was not within the rule in
Shelley's Case.
STREET RAILWAYS.

The Chicago General Railway Company filed a bill to enjoin
Carter If. Harrison, and others, representing the city of Chicago,
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cutting wires of complainants
from
t
Street

which were used

to supply private motors in the lumber district of
Railway,
Permit to the city. The original permit to put up the wires
String Wires, was for "necessary feed wires" along the street
Construction

car route.

Such permit was held not wide enough

to include the distribution of power to private motors.

The

proposed action of the mayor was accordingly not in violation

of any charter right of complainants, and the injunction was
refused: Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Ellicott, 88 Fed. 94I.

SURETYSHIP.

It is a familiar principle of suretyship law that one of several co-sureties, who signs upon the express condition that
Co-Sureties, the others sign, is not bound where the others do
Signature

by one,

Condition

not sign, unless the obligee had no notice of the
condition. This was applied to exonerate the
surety in Mddleboro Bank v. Richards, 76 N. W.

(Neb.) 528, the signature of the non-assenting surety, per an
unauthorized agent, being, in the opinion of the court, a doubt
which should have put the obligee on his guard. Nor was
the subsequent ratification (by assent) of the unassenting
surety sufficient to bind those who had stipulated for his
original signature.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, in an action against
a telegraph company for negligence in failing to deliver a
Non-delivcry
of Message,

Notice

message, whereby plaintiff was prevented from attending the funeral of his child, held that the
message---" Your child very low; come at once"

-was sufficient to put the company on notice that the child
might die at any moment, and called for prompt delivery:
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wailer, 47 S. W. 396.
The same court, in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Sweetman, 47
S. W. 676, holds that the telegraph company is charged with
notice of the relationship existing between the
Notice of
Relationship addressee and a sick person, concerning whom

the telegram is sent, whether such relationship is disclosed
therein or not.

